Embodied Cognition
Embodied cognition is the theory that many features of cognition, human or otherwise, are shaped by aspects of an organism's entire body. Sensory and motor systems are seen as fundamentally integrated with cognitive processing[1].
Embodied cognition has roots in motor behavior; it emphasizes that cognition involves acting with a physical body on an environment in which that body is immersed.
Using philosophical lingo, an agent's cognition, rather than being the product of mere (innate) abstract representations of the world, is strongly influenced by aspects of an agent's body beyond the brain itself.
Whereas traditional cognitive science explains mental processes are computational processes (and thus views the brain as the seat of cognition), embodied cognition rejects or reformulates the computational grounding:
- Emphasizes the significance of an agent’s physical body in cognitive abilities.
- The body or the body’s interactions with the environment constitute or contribute to cognition in ways that require a new framework for its investigation.
- Mental processes are not, or not only, computational processes.
- The brain is not a computer or not the seat of cognition.
Repercussions
If cognition is a dynamic interplay of individual bodily and environmental processes, then research can no longer be restricted to third-person operational descriptions but should consider subjective and phenomenological observations from a 1st and 2nd-person perspective (Varela et al. 1993; Lutz, 2002; Lutz and Thompson, 2003; Petitmengin, 2006).
The embodied view in cognitive science has implications for understanding the self.
References
- Lutz, A. (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: a first empirical case study. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 1, 133–167.
- Lutz, A., and Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology: integrating subjective
experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud. 10, 31–52.
- Petitmengin, C. (2006). Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: an interview method for the science of consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud. 14, 54–82.
- Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1993). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.