Enactive Approach: Difference between revisions
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==References== | ==References== | ||
* Clark, A. (2001). Mindware. Oxford: Oxford University Press. | |||
* Thompson, E., and Varela, F. (2001). Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 5, 418–425. | |||
* Di Paolo, E., Rohde, M., and De Jaegher, H. (2010). “Horizons for the enactive mind: values, social interaction and play,” in Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, eds J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 33–87. | |||
Revision as of 12:49, 1 February 2023
The Enactive Approach holds that biological and mental phenomena are continuous, which means that it characterizes the identity of cognitive beings by similar principles and concepts as the identity of living beings.
References
- Clark, A. (2001). Mindware. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thompson, E., and Varela, F. (2001). Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 5, 418–425.
- Di Paolo, E., Rohde, M., and De Jaegher, H. (2010). “Horizons for the enactive mind: values, social interaction and play,” in Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, eds J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 33–87.