D*A*R*IA: Testing Model of Principled Reasoning: Difference between revisions
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Michael Sargent | Michael Sargent | ||
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==Short Definition== | |||
The purpose of Sargent’s work is to test a theoretical model that describes the necessary conditions for explicit principled reasoning. | |||
==Summary Points== | |||
#This research work addresses one question: under what conditions are people’s judgments and decisions organized around the same principles that they consciously endorse? | |||
#The purpose of Sargent’s work is to test a theoretical model that describes the necessary conditions for explicit principled reasoning. | |||
#Sargent proposes a series of experiments to test this model, including two with nationally representative samples. The goal is to show that when these conditions hold, individuals’ judgments are influenced by considerations relevant to the principles that they endorse, and that their judgments are not influenced by factors irrelevant to those principles. | |||
#two online experiments on explicit principled reasoning have begun. The focus of each study is the application of the principle of deterrence in punitive decision-making. | |||
==Text from Wisdom Institute== | |||
This research work addresses one question: under what conditions are people’s judgments and decisions organized around the same principles that they consciously endorse? To the extent that existing models of wisdom suggest generally applicable principles of wisdom, this work may help indicate the conditions under which individuals can consciously apply those principles. Preliminary conclusions suggest that it is often difficult to resolve the discrepancies between principles that individuals consciously endorse and the principles they actually apply. Future research will strive to better understand how context can promote principled reasoning, as well as the conditions under which such principled reasoning is adaptive. | This research work addresses one question: under what conditions are people’s judgments and decisions organized around the same principles that they consciously endorse? To the extent that existing models of wisdom suggest generally applicable principles of wisdom, this work may help indicate the conditions under which individuals can consciously apply those principles. Preliminary conclusions suggest that it is often difficult to resolve the discrepancies between principles that individuals consciously endorse and the principles they actually apply. Future research will strive to better understand how context can promote principled reasoning, as well as the conditions under which such principled reasoning is adaptive. | ||
D*A*R*IA: Testing a Model of Principled Reasoning | D*A*R*IA: Testing a Model of Principled Reasoning | ||
The focus of Sargent’s project is explicit principled reasoning, by which he means reasoning that is driven by principles that individuals can articulate. Intuitionist models of judgment assert that such reasoning is rare, if not impossible. Instead, such models assume that the language of principle is invoked post hoc to justify judgments that are in fact driven by intuition, which itself may be a product of affect and/or partisan preferences. The purpose of Sargent’s work is to test a theoretical model that describes the necessary conditions for explicit principled reasoning. In short, it asks what must be true for genuine rationalism to prevail? At its core, Sargent’s model assumes that explicit principled reasoning can occur when (a) principles are well-defined in advance of encountering any cases to which they would be applied, (b) such principles come to mind at the time of a judgment, (c) those principles are deemed relevant, and (d) the person rendering the judgment is sufficiently motivated to act consistently that he or she feels bound by their prior definition. Sargent proposes a series of experiments to test this model, including two with nationally representative samples. The goal is to show that when these conditions hold, individuals’ judgments are influenced by considerations relevant to the principles that they endorse, and that their judgments are not influenced by factors irrelevant to those principles. The theoretical promise lies in its potential to suggest why genuine explicit principled reasoning is so rare by default (i.e., the necessary conditions are too numerous). Its practical promise lies in its potential to suggest concrete steps real-world decision-makers might take to promote such reasoning. | The focus of Sargent’s project is explicit principled reasoning, by which he means reasoning that is driven by principles that individuals can articulate. Intuitionist models of judgment assert that such reasoning is rare, if not impossible. Instead, such models assume that the language of principle is invoked post hoc to justify judgments that are in fact driven by intuition, which itself may be a product of affect and/or partisan preferences. The purpose of Sargent’s work is to test a theoretical model that describes the necessary conditions for explicit principled reasoning. In short, it asks what must be true for genuine rationalism to prevail? At its core, Sargent’s model assumes that explicit principled reasoning can occur when (a) principles are well-defined in advance of encountering any cases to which they would be applied, (b) such principles come to mind at the time of a judgment, (c) those principles are deemed relevant, and (d) the person rendering the judgment is sufficiently motivated to act consistently that he or she feels bound by their prior definition. Sargent proposes a series of experiments to test this model, including two with nationally representative samples. The goal is to show that when these conditions hold, individuals’ judgments are influenced by considerations relevant to the principles that they endorse, and that their judgments are not influenced by factors irrelevant to those principles. The theoretical promise lies in its potential to suggest why genuine explicit principled reasoning is so rare by default (i.e., the necessary conditions are too numerous). Its practical promise lies in its potential to suggest concrete steps real-world decision-makers might take to promote such reasoning. | ||
Latest revision as of 10:41, 5 October 2020
Michael Sargent
Short Definition
The purpose of Sargent’s work is to test a theoretical model that describes the necessary conditions for explicit principled reasoning.
Summary Points
- This research work addresses one question: under what conditions are people’s judgments and decisions organized around the same principles that they consciously endorse?
- The purpose of Sargent’s work is to test a theoretical model that describes the necessary conditions for explicit principled reasoning.
- Sargent proposes a series of experiments to test this model, including two with nationally representative samples. The goal is to show that when these conditions hold, individuals’ judgments are influenced by considerations relevant to the principles that they endorse, and that their judgments are not influenced by factors irrelevant to those principles.
- two online experiments on explicit principled reasoning have begun. The focus of each study is the application of the principle of deterrence in punitive decision-making.
Text from Wisdom Institute
This research work addresses one question: under what conditions are people’s judgments and decisions organized around the same principles that they consciously endorse? To the extent that existing models of wisdom suggest generally applicable principles of wisdom, this work may help indicate the conditions under which individuals can consciously apply those principles. Preliminary conclusions suggest that it is often difficult to resolve the discrepancies between principles that individuals consciously endorse and the principles they actually apply. Future research will strive to better understand how context can promote principled reasoning, as well as the conditions under which such principled reasoning is adaptive.
D*A*R*IA: Testing a Model of Principled Reasoning
The focus of Sargent’s project is explicit principled reasoning, by which he means reasoning that is driven by principles that individuals can articulate. Intuitionist models of judgment assert that such reasoning is rare, if not impossible. Instead, such models assume that the language of principle is invoked post hoc to justify judgments that are in fact driven by intuition, which itself may be a product of affect and/or partisan preferences. The purpose of Sargent’s work is to test a theoretical model that describes the necessary conditions for explicit principled reasoning. In short, it asks what must be true for genuine rationalism to prevail? At its core, Sargent’s model assumes that explicit principled reasoning can occur when (a) principles are well-defined in advance of encountering any cases to which they would be applied, (b) such principles come to mind at the time of a judgment, (c) those principles are deemed relevant, and (d) the person rendering the judgment is sufficiently motivated to act consistently that he or she feels bound by their prior definition. Sargent proposes a series of experiments to test this model, including two with nationally representative samples. The goal is to show that when these conditions hold, individuals’ judgments are influenced by considerations relevant to the principles that they endorse, and that their judgments are not influenced by factors irrelevant to those principles. The theoretical promise lies in its potential to suggest why genuine explicit principled reasoning is so rare by default (i.e., the necessary conditions are too numerous). Its practical promise lies in its potential to suggest concrete steps real-world decision-makers might take to promote such reasoning.
Thus far, two online experiments on explicit principled reasoning have begun. The focus of each study is the application of the principle of deterrence in punitive decision-making. Previous work has identified a discrepancy between individuals’ endorsement and application of deterrence. They generally endorse it as a rationale for punishing criminals, but their levels of support for criminals in specific instances are largely insensitive to factors that should matter according to deterrence theory. Because these previous studies have relied on undergraduate samples, it is likely the case that participants’ understanding of the principle of deterrence is less well defined than among legal experts. The purpose of the first study is to replicate some of the prior deterrence studies with legal experts, such as attorneys and judges. The second study is a test of perspective-taking as a moderator of the effects of deterrence-relevant factors. The central question here is whether asking participants to mentally simulate the perspective of a criminal—considering the factors that would enter into a decision to commit a crime or not—will increase participants’ sensitivity to deterrence-relevant factors. Sargent and his research assistants are finalizing the materials for this study and preparing to publish it to the web.
https://wisdomcenter.uchicago.edu/about/project-1-defining-wisdom