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Embodied Cognition: Difference between revisions
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* The brain is not a computer or not the seat of cognition. | * The brain is not a computer or not the seat of cognition. | ||
==Repercussions== | |||
If cognition is a dynamic interplay of individual bodily and environmental processes, then research can no longer be restricted to third-person operational descriptions but should consider subjective and phenomenological observations from a 1st and 2nd-person perspective (Varela et al. 1993; Lutz, 2002; Lutz and Thompson, 2003; Petitmengin, 2006). | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
* Lutz, A. (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: a first empirical case study. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 1, 133–167. | |||
* Lutz, A., and Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology: integrating subjective | |||
experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. J. Conscious. | |||
Stud. 10, 31–52. | |||
* Petitmengin, C. (2006). Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: an interview method for the science of consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud. 14, 54–82. | |||
* Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1993). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. | |||
==Citations== | |||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
[[Category:Systems Concepts]] | [[Category:Systems Concepts]] | ||